By placing the title question alongside ve comparative questions and offering answers to the whole set as given by seven imaginar y respondents, this paper analyzes the question's deceptiveness and the inconsistency of its implied claims. Apar t from ambiguities of situation, history, and agency, the question's demand for a choice between "your child" and "nonhuman animals" obscures a eld of other values regarding (1) species, (2) family ties, and (3) the wrongness-in-itself (or otherwise) of the experiments envisioned. This paper argues that while a "No" answer to the title question does not, as intended by the questioner, support the experimental status quo, even a "Yes" answer does not re ect a choice between one's own child and animals.
animals versus human beings; child versus human stranger; and experiments versus other morally questionable acts.
Clearing Misunderstandings
Before addressing these complexities, some more general misunderstandings that the title question encourages should be cleared away.
Misleads as to the Actual Situation Envisioned
It suggests a "lifeboat" situation in which there is an animal in the next room and your child's life could be saved by experimenting on the animal. Or, more realistically (the fantasy version nevertheless having been placed in the respondent's mind), it evokes a parent withholding a life-saving animal-tested drug from the child. The true situation is that abolitionists are trying to prevent future tests being done on animals, not to stop people using existing medicines, where the harm to animals cannot be undone. If this position seems inconsistent, consider your reaction to the discovery that a certain medicine had been tested on prisoners-of-war or handicapped children. Would you be willing to use the medicine to save life; and if so, would you therefore support the continuation of such experiments? Indeed, it has been asserted that German and Japanese wartime human experiments have worked (LaFollette & Shanks, 1996, p. 257) , but this has not been advanced as an argument for more of the same.
It is true that in seeking to ban any future animal experiments, the anti-vivisectionist is accepting an eventual risk to her child's (or another's) life. But this is not the same thing as the certain harm necessitated by a lifeboat decision and by current research practice. However, lifeboat decisions are also vulnerable to the comparative-questions procedure.
Misleads as to the Historical Situation
In implying an inherent con ict of interest between the child and the animal in the laboratory, the question obscures the fact that the con ict of interest has been manufactured by the long-entrenched habit of using animals-to the point where such usage has become "the central element in the current biomedical paradigm" (LaFollette & Shanks (1996, p. 32 ).
Manufactured con icts of interest arise whenever a dominant group has made some aspect of its well-being dependent on oppression of another group and then, on being morally challenged from within, demands, "Whose side are you on-that of your own kind, or that of Group B?" There is an inherent con ict of interest between a human being and a hungry lion unexpectedly encountered in the forest or between a human being and a germ. In such situations, neither side would be blamed for defending its vital interests. But there is only a manufactured con ict of interest between a human being and an animal used for research.
Misleads as to the Type of Agency Involved on Each Side
"Let your child die" is a loaded expression, because "to let something happen" implies that you had the means to prevent it and that those means were morally acceptable. If they were not, they would never occur to you as a solution. You would not be accused of "letting your child die" because you had refrained from killing another child to obtain an organ transplant. So, in using that expression, the title question assumes the values it claims to be promoting. Animal experiments are de ned as the passive, default action; refraining from them, the aggressive anomaly. It is true that omission, say through not giving a medicine, can be as morally objectionable as commission-but only if the omitted act is acceptable in itself.
The Exercise
The implied claims of the title question are as follows:
1. The animal experiments debate is about loyalty to your child versus loyalty to animals; 2. Only animal, and not human, experiments should be done; and 3. Animal experiments may be used to bene t all people.
Regarding (1): Do I mean it implies the debate is only about that? Or primarily? Or at all? As with the actual situation envisioned, the psychology of the respondent on this point is uncertain. It will vary with the answers to the comparative questions, and each case will be analyzed. But the effect of the title question is to isolate the factors of "your child" and "animals" in order to support the status quo, which embodies claims (2) and (3).
If "your child" is read as a measure of loyalty to all humanity, the interpretation would be refuted by any difference in the answers concerning "your child" and "unknown human." Regarding claim (3), animal experiments are, of course, often used to bene t animals as well as people; but there is not space to include the factor of veterinary medicine, and its absence does not affect the points being made.
Six Questions
The six questions, including the title one, are as follows:
1. Would you let your child die rather than experiment on animals?
2. Would you let your child die rather than experiment on non-volunteer humans?
3. Would you let an unknown human die rather than experiment on animals?
4. Would you let an unknown human die rather than experiment on nonvolunteer humans?
5. Is there any act (Act X) that you would let your child die rather than commit?
6. Is there any act (Act X) that you would let an unknown human die rather than commit?
Analysing the Answers
Three factors are assessed in analyzing the sets of answers: speciesism, family ties, and the wrongness-in-itself of the experiment. By speciesism, I mean the belief that human beings should have priority over animals in moral decision-making, sometimes expressed as the claim that humans are "superior to" or "more important than" animals. The rst four questions test speciesism and family ties. Questions 5 and 6, besides testing whether there can be ethical limits on family ties, also test the perceived wrongness-in-itself of any experiment, the willingness or unwillingness to do, which is compared with the willingness or unwillingness to do Act X.
The answers to questions 5 and 6 are signi cant only if someone answers, "Yes" to 5 or 6 but, "No" to its counterpart as regards family status or species of experimental subject or bene ciary: For example, "Yes, I would let a stranger die rather than commit Act X", but, "No, I would not let a stranger die rather than experiment on animals." Here, experimenting on animals is seen as less wrong-in-itself than Act X.
The answers, "Yes" and "Yes", or "No" and "No" to question 5 or 6 and its respective counterpart occur in the exercise but are insigni cant as they do not tell you whether the experiment is thought to be equally bad as Act X.
And since it would be contradictory to say, "No, there is no act that I would let child/stranger die rather than commit" but "Yes, I would let child/stranger die rather than do one or other type of experiment" ("No" to 5 but "Yes" to 1 or 2; "No" to 6 but "Yes" to 3 or 4), I have not used these combinations in constructing the sets.
The factor of wrongness-in-itself could be challenged by Slicer's (1991) contextual rather than absolutist approach. Using the "imperfect comparisons" of "euthanasia" and "just war," she comments: "But for many thoughtful people the question of whether animals should be used in research is more pertinently one of when they should be used and how they will be treated" (p. 117). Addressing the personal context, Slicer calls for consideration of "preexisting emotional or other bonds we might have to members of our own species, community, friends, family, or lovers who may suffer as a result of Singer 's and Regan's recommendations" (p. 119).
However, you cannot answer when or how without also answering whether.
If you say, "When?-only in such-and-such a situation; How?-in such-andsuch a way," you already have answered, "Yes" to "whether." You have assumed the right to do the act, although choosing to consider certain limits on it. If, on the other hand, you say, "When?-never; How?-no way," you have answered, "No" to "whether," leaving the "When" and "How" functionless. Questions 5 and 6, then, ask the reader rst to consider that there might be some acts that are regarded as so very wrong, at least prima facie, that people would reject them automatically without being aware of taking an absolutist position; and second, to compare people's willingness, or unwillingness, to commit such acts in certain extreme circumstances with the willingness, or unwillingness to do the experiments indicated in questions 1 to 4.
The Place of Empiricism in Answering the Questions
Although abolitionists rely heavily on arguments against the ef cacy of animal experiments, my imaginary respondents and the reader are asked to assume such ef cacy in order to exclude empirical factors other than the ethically central question of whether experimental animals suffer. This is because empirical arguments undermine ethical choice. As G. B. Shaw observed, "If we attempt to controvert a vivisectionist by showing that the experiment he has performed has not led to any useful result, you imply that if it had led to a useful result you would consider his experiment justi ed" (Clark, 1977, p. 2) .
Research scientists, themselves, sacri ce expediency to their own humanist ethics-inasmuch as human subjects would be preferable for controlled research into human medicine-but animals, although second-best, are chosen for ethical reasons. Repeatedly one encounters statements such as Sir Peter Medawar's in LaFollette, & Shanks (1996) : "It is better that laboratory animals should be used than that tests should be made directly upon human beings" (p. 8).
An example of how empirical argument undermines ethics lies in the question of how like or unlike us the experimental animal is. Here, researcher and abolitionist alike fall into inconsistency. The former says the animal is like enough for the experiment to be reliable but unlike enough for it to be morally acceptable. The latter says the animal is too unlike us for the experiment to be reliable but like enough to render it morally unacceptable. Either way, the empirical claim works against the ethical one.
One might criticize on logical rather than empirical grounds the claim of Sigma Xi, 1992 that medical progress could not have been made, and never can be made, without the use of animals: ". . . research with animals has made possible most of the advances in medicine that we today take for granted.
An end to animal research would mean an end to our best hope for nding treatments that still elude us" (LaFollette and Shanks, 1996, p. 4).
The statement implies provable negatives that may or may not be true. As to the past, we can never know; as to the future, we could know only by trying to manage without animal experiments and nding that we could; if we could not, there always would be the possibility of successful alternatives in the future. But for argument's sake, the contention will be allowed. Accordingly, in order to focus on ethical choices, in this exercise the questions and answers contain the assumption that animal experiments are reliable and necessary. One empirical question is, nevertheless, inseparable from the moral one: Do animals suffer from experiments? Without suffering, debate about the right to life would remain and will be discussed later. But "if research on animals was never painful and did not involve con ning them, it is doubtful whether the public would be as concerned" (Morton, 1989, p. 169) .
Addressing the Question of Suffering
There are few who would nowadays maintain, with Descartes, that animals cannot suffer, although reductive terminology may be used to obscure the fact. But do experimental animals suffer? Research scientists themselves, and the laws and agencies regulating their activities, acknowledge suffering.
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "institutions claim that only 5-6 percent of their animals are in category E research" ("causing pain and distress not relieved by drugs"); (LaFollette & Shanks, 1996, p. 249) . These gures "exclude research using rats and mice. 2. Although "procedure" would more accurately cover all the relevant research activities, the term "experiment" is kept to conform to the title question.
3. "Research" means medical research on non-volunteer living subjects.
4. Not all plausible variants of the title question have been used. These very omissions-such as animals as bene ciaries of the experiment or of Act X; human marginal cases in any role; oneself in any role; and one's own child as research subject-further reveal its hidden complexity.
5. When a question speci es human research subjects, they would have the same conditions as laboratory animals: They would be (a) imprisoned, innocent non-volunteers, either bred or captured for research; (b) allowed such re nements as currently are available for some animals, such as group housing (Hampson, 1989, p. 245) ; and (c) humanely destroyed after use.
6. Research subjects would all have been made ill or bred with predispositions to illness rather than being genuine patients having new procedures tried on them primarily for their own good.
7. None of the experiments would be for cosmetics, household products, or psychological research. The reason is that there is already widespread disapproval of such tests, some of which are banned, and my aim is to examine the vivisection case at its strongest point, namely medicine.
8. The animals would be vertebrates, who "have well-developed nervous systems and therefore are more likely to experience pain and suffering . . . than are other types of organisms" (Stephens, 1989, p. 151). 9. Respondents are to ignore practical problems of the experiments, such as the con nement of non-volunteer humans, and to concentrate on ethics.
Analyzing the Sets of Answers
In considering these, you may want to consult the following abbreviated summary of the questions and the seven sets of answers, which have been chosen for psychological plausibility (see Table 1 ). The answer to the title question is given in bold, because that is the one whose meaning is being elucidated.
It may seem confusing to put the answers in terms of, "No, I wouldn't let A die rather than do B" instead of the corresponding, "Yes, I would do B to save A", but this is necessary to match the title question, which presents an accusation intended to provoke a defensive "No". The question's implied claims also are repeated for consultation. 
Implied claims of the title question:
(a) The vivisection debate is (only? primarily? at all?) about loyalty to your child versus loyalty to animals. (b) Only animal, and not human, experiments should be done. (c) Animal experiments may be used to bene t all people. When the discussion refers to a "claim", it means "implied claim".
Set 1 Answers: NNNYNY
Both family ties and speciesism are present. In being willing to sacri ce both animals and humans and to commit Act X for her child, whereas she would not sanction the latter two things for the unknown human, the respondent allows no limits to family ties. Speciesism is found in the distinction between allowing the unknown human to bene t from animal research but not from human research. But since the respondent would do anything to save her child, the debate is only partly about "your child" versus "animals", and so claim (a) is only partly met. The answers do not support exclusively animal research, so claim (b) is not met; but animal research would be used to bene t all people, so claim (c) is met.
Set 2 Answers: NNNYYY
Here, family ties and speciesism are present in equal measure, because the person would experiment on humans (as well as animals) for her own child but would not experiment on humans for a stranger. However, her willingness to allow her child to die rather than commit Act X establishes limits to family ties. Claim (a) is not met because she would experiment on humans to save her child; claim (b) is not met for the same reason; but claim (c) is met since both the child and the stranger could be saved by animal experiments.
Despite the tendentiousness of the expression, "allow to die," I use it in order to echo the title question-which shows how the terms in which a debate is constructed can push one's thinking in a certain direction.
Set 3 Answers: NYNYYY
The debate was not, on the face of it, about "your child" versus "animals" at all, because both the "stranger" and "your child" would bene t from animal experiments but would be allowed to die rather than be saved by experiments on humans or by Act X; so the family factor does not enter into it.
Claim (a) is not met.
Comparison of answers 5 and 6 with the others shows that the respondent regards animal experiments as not wrong-in-themselves. Human experiments are considered wrong-in-themselves but not necessarily as wrong as Act X.
The fact that she rules out the latter shows that she recognizes limits to family ties or other-human loyalty but does not consider animal experiments to exceed those limits. So the main value to emerge is speciesism. The answers do support exclusively animal research to bene t all people, so claims (b) and (c) are met.
Set 4 Answers: NNYYNY
The main value is family ties, combined with aversion to experiments. The respondent would allow both human and animal experiments to save her child but would let the unknown human die rather than be saved by either type of experiment. Claim (a) is not met. Answers 5 and 6 show that, as with either type of experiment, she would commit Act X for her child but not for a stranger; but we cannot tell from this whether she considers the experiments as wrong as Act X.
The answers do not support exclusively animal experiments, because both human and animal experiments would be allowed for her own child; claim (b) is not met. Since animal (like human) experiments would not bene t all people but only her own child, claim (c) is not met.
Set 5 Answers: NNYYYY
Here the respondent would sacri ce both humans and animals for her own child but neither group for the unknown human. Family ties, however, like unknown-human-loyalty, are limited by the unwillingness to commit act X.
Where her own child is concerned, Act X is considered more wrong than either type of experiment; so, although experiments also are considered wrong in the unknown-human case (as shown by answers 3 and 4), they are not considered as wrong as Act X.
Since no species distinctions are drawn but only family distinctions, claim (a) is not met. Since human as well as animal experiments would be allowed for her own child but not for all people, claims (b) and (c) are not met.
Set 6 Answers: NYYYYY
This respondent's, "No" solely to the title question shows that here the debate is indeed about "your child" versus "animals." Humans would not be sacri ced for her own child, and neither animals nor humans would be sacri ced for an unknown human. The strong moral sense shown by unwillingness to commit Act X even for her child, or to experiment on humans for anyone, or to experiment on animals for the unknown human gives added signi cance to the one "No" answer. Speciesism is shown by the fact that animal experiments would be countenanced in the case where Act X or human experiments are not. (Because human experiments, like Act X, would not be countenanced in any case, we cannot tell whether they are considered equally as wrong as Act X.) So claim (a) is met.
Since the answers do support exclusively animal experiments, claim (b) is also met; but as those would bene t only the respondent's own child, not all people, claim (c) is not met.
Set 7 Answers: YYYYYY
The rst "Yes" must be accompanied by ve other "Yes" answers. After explaining why, I will suggest the thinking behind the initial "Yes".
Only the "poodle-loving man-hater" remark applied to Schopenhauer (Clark, 1977, p. 48) of speciesist demonology would be willing to experiment on humans, but not on animals, to save her child. So a "Yes" to question 1 requires a "Yes" to question 2. Only someone who particularly hated her own child would let the child die rather than experiment on animals or humans but also would not let a stranger die in both those cases. So "Yes" to questions 1 and 2 requires "Yes" to questions 3 and 4 as well. Regarding questions 5 and 6, as explained earlier, you could not without contradiction say "Yes" to 1 or 2 and "No" to 5, or "Yes" to 3 or 4 and "No" to 6. So the "Yes" answers to questions 1 to 4 require "Yes" answers to questions 5 and 6 as well.
Values and Assumptions Indicated by a "Yes" to the Title Question
All these responses derive from emotion in the sense of preference or aversion. I support Slicer's (1991) view that "faith in the rational and universal force of principles at the expense of our emotional responses is naive, based on . . . a Western and perhaps masculinist contempt for our emotions" (p. 115).
Singer 's and Regan's professions of rationalist faith (Slicer, p. 115) con ict with the emotional force of their writing and with their personal commitment. Honest emotional appeals on both sides of the vivisection debate are the most relevant ones, because if no one cared either about curing diseases or about animal well-being there would be no debate in the rst place. What is needed is "recognition of the 'fusion of feeling and thought' as characteristic of moral life" Slicer (1991, p. 115) quoting Kheel, with thought-playing an instrumental role. The respondent's initial "Yes" would refer to the actual situation underlying the controversy: namely, not a lifeboat dilemma, but a campaign to end future experiments. She would give the child animal-tested medicine if it were the only treatment available, because there the damage to animals could not be undone. But she would take the risk that an end to vivisection might cause her child's death in the future.
The aversion to the active harm done by experiments on non-volunteers (human or animal) would re ect a belief that research subjects are harmed more from the research being done than prospective bene ciaries would be harmed by its not being done. "Harm" would be considered in relation both to suffering and to the right-to-life.
Suffering. The research bene ciary (the patient) is an object of concern, and effort is made to keep the patient comfortable; but the research subject, being a tool, is allowed only such comfort as is consistent with research purposes, economic practicality, and legal constraints. The patient may have a family; the research subject is denied family and social life. The research subject is sometimes caused suffering deliberately (where intrinsic to the procedure) or knowingly (as an unavoidable part of the procedure), in neither case for his own eventual bene t; this is never done to a patient. Animals' cognitive limits, such as relative lack of anticipation and memory, may lessen their suffering. But this would be balanced by inability to understand, re ect on, or try to relieve their situation. Although the human patient's relatives would suffer more than would the relatives of some experimental animals, other animals show great distress when separated from their young.
In any case, this factor is outweighed by the others mentioned.
Rights. In considering the extension of "rights" to animals, one need not make unveri able claims of "moral worth," "inherent value," or the like. Rather, one might consult feelings of aversion toward treatment of human beings that violates their rights without causing any suffering (including mental suffering, as in the case of a person too ill to know what was happening), and ask whether such aversion would be inappropriate in the case of animals, and if so, why. How would one react to the creature in Adams (1980, pp. 92-93) who positively wants to be eaten? The character in the restaurant, far from being reassured by the creature's lack of suffering, feels even more revulsion against using a being who has had the will to live removed.
On both "suffering" and "rights" grounds, the respondent who answered "Yes" might have tested the matter by preference and concluded that it was better to be an ill or bereaved human than an animal in the laboratory or a human in the laboratory and that this was why the experiments were unjusti ed.
Conclusion
Considering the many hidden questions of value that would enter into a person's response to the title question, apart from its ambiguities of situation, history, and agency, there is no combination of answers to the six questions that could securely support all three implied claims. This is because the title question (1) appeals to a personal attachment (which might be deemed adequate grounds for doing something otherwise felt to be wrong) in order to justify a policy that is universally applied; while (2) also linking that attachment to a species bias that would limit what could be done to honor the attachment.
Regarding (1), just because you would choose your kid's life over that of a neighbor's kid in a situation of true emergency does not mean that you would favor allowing certain kids to be sacri ced for other kids as a matter of social policy (Animal Rights Law Project, 1996, p. 2).
Regarding (2), where experiments on animals but not on humans are condoned, the responses show the great extent to which the force of the title question depends not on duty of care to children but on an assumption of human moral superiority.
So I would say to the woman at the stall:
Of course, use existing medicines for your son, as there the harm to animals has already been done. But that would be the case also with medicines tested on helpless human beings, and while you might use those, you would not necessarily support doing more such experiments, even to prolong your child's life. And you might not consider that you had "let your child die" by refusing to support them.
Consider how you would feel at the prospect of humans being used for research by extraterrestrials who were convinced that they were more important than we are. They too might feel obliged to sacri ce humans to save their own offspring. Only if you would consider them to have "let their offspring die" through leaving human beings alone could you consistently feel.
To avoid actively causing certain suffering and death, I would oppose both animal and non-voluntary human experiments, even if they might some day save my child's life. I don't need to campaign to end human experiments, since they are not being done anyway. But I do need to campaign against animal experiments, and that is why you think I care more for animals than for humans. In fact, I only choose to avoid hurting any sentient 
